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A Diachronic Approach to Bob Jones: 
Religious Tax Exemptions After Obergefell 
SAMUEL D. BRUNSON* & DAVID J. HERZIG† 
In Bob Jones University v. United States, the Supreme Court held that an entity may 
lose its tax exemption if it violates a fundamental public policy, even where religious 
beliefs demand that violation. In that case, the Court held that racial discrimination 
violated fundamental public policy. Could the determination to exclude same-sex in-
dividuals from marriage or attending a college also be considered a violation of 
fundamental public policy? There is uncertainty in the answer. In the re-
cent Obergefell v. Hodges case that legalized same-sex marriage, the Court asserted 
that LGBT individuals are entitled to “equal dignity in the eyes of the law.” Consti-
tutional law scholars, such as Laurence Tribe, are advocating that faith groups might 
lose their status, citing that this decision is the dawning of a new era of constitutional 
doctrine in which fundamental public policy will have a more broad application. 
Regardless of whether Obergefell marks a shift in fundamental public policy, that 
shift will happen at some point. The problem is, under the current diachronic 
fundamental-public-policy regime, tax-exempt organizations have no way to know, 
ex ante, what will violate a fundamental public policy. We believe that the purpose 
of the fundamental-public-policy requirement is to discourage bad behavior in ad-
vance, rather than merely to punish it after it occurs. As a result, we believe that the 
government should clearly delineate a manner for determining what constitutes a 
fundamental public policy. We recommend three safe harbor regimes that would al-
low religiously affiliated tax-exempt organizations to know what kinds of discrimi-
nation are incompatible with tax exemption. Tying the definition of fundamental pub-
lic policy to strict scrutiny, to the Civil Rights Act, or to equal protection allows a 
tax-exempt entity to ensure compliance, ex post. In the end, though, we believe that 
the flexibility attendant to equal protection, mixed with the nimbleness that the Treas-
ury Department would enjoy in crafting a blacklist of prohibited discrimination, 
would provide the best and most effective safe harbor regime. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of Obergefell v. Hodges,1 opponents of same-sex marriage have been 
asking how the Supreme Court’s decision will affect religious liberty.2 On its face, 
this juxtaposition of same-sex marriage and religious liberty seems alarmist and far 
outside the contours of the decision. After all, religions should be free to determine 
the tenets of their faith, including whether or not to perform same-sex marriages.3  
But could government put undue pressure on religions and religiously affiliated 
organizations, post-Obergefell, through, for example, the tax law?4 There is a real 
concern that if religious institutions refuse to embrace same-sex marriage, they will 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 2. See Dennis Romboy, A Look at the ‘12 Religious Freedom Grenades’ Launched by 
the Supreme Court Decision on Marriage, DESERET NEWS (July 7, 2015, 4:10 PM), http:// 
national.deseretnews.com/article/5096/a-look-at-the-12-religious-freedom-grenades8217 
-launched-by-the-supreme-court-decision-on-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/9HZF-HV7W]. 
 3. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 401 (1963); Russell K. Robinson, Unequal 
Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 205 (2016); Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its 
Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 16, 30–31 (2015); Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 176 (2015). 
 4. See, e.g., David J. Herzig & Samuel D. Brunson, Tax Exemption, Public Policy, and 
Discriminatory Fraternities, 35 VA. TAX REV. 116, 116 (2015) [hereinafter Herzig & Brunson, 
Tax Exemption] (arguing that the IRS should reject tax exemptions of social clubs “if there is 
disparate impact, at minimum as to race, in their policies”); David J. Herzig & Samuel D. 
Brunson, Subsidized Injustice: Racist Fraternities and Sororities Should Have Their Tax-
Exempt Status Revoked, SLATE (Mar. 13, 2015, 10:31 AM), http://www.slate.com 
/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/03/racist_fraternities_sororities_and_universi 
ties_should_have_their_tax_exempt.html [https://perma.cc/6P9Y-XDXV]; David J. Herzig, 
Donald Trump Suggests He Was Audited Because of His ‘Strong Christian Faith.’ Here’s Why 
That’s Unlikely, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news 
/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/02/26/donald-trump-suggests-he-was-audited-because-of-his-strong 
-christian-faith-heres-why-thats-unlikely/ [https://perma.cc/D32Q-7U74]. But see Peter J. 
Reilly, Don’t Sic IRS on Racist Frat Boys, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2015, 9:43 AM), http://www 
.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2015/03/16/dont-sick-irs-on-racist-frat-boys/ [https://perma.cc 
/439H-E8YW]. 
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lose their tax exemptions.5 And that risk is not necessarily hypothetical: a significant 
number of tax-exempt organizations, many of which are affiliated with religions, 
continue to discriminate against LGBT individuals,6 notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court’s assertion that LGBT individuals are entitled to “equal dignity in the eyes of 
the law.”7 
On its surface, of course, Obergefell says nothing about private discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. The litigants in Obergefell disagreed on a narrow and 
well-defined question: whether states could constitutionally deny marriage to same-
sex couples.8 The Court decided that there was a fundamental right to marry and 
rejected the various states’ prohibitions on same-sex marriage.9 The obligations of 
states to perform marriages, however, cannot be generalized to churches. The fun-
damental right the majority recognizes is a right against the state.10 In fact, Justice 
Kennedy explicitly acknowledged that “religions, and those who adhere to religious 
doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine 
precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned.”11 Churches, according to 
Justice Kennedy, continue to be secure in their right to understand for themselves 
God’s law.  
Despite the narrow focus on state obligations, almost instantly the discussion of 
legalized same-sex marriage became wrapped up in, and to some extent confused 
with, questions of religious freedom and tax policy. Even in his dissent, Chief Justice 
Roberts cautioned that “the tax exemptions of some religious institutions would be 
in question if they opposed same-sex marriage. . . . Unfortunately, people of faith 
can take no comfort in the treatment they receive from the majority today.”12 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. See, e.g., Mark Oppenheimer, Now’s the Time To End Tax Exemptions for Religious 
Institutions, TIME (June 28, 2015), http://time.com/3939143/nows-the-time-to-end-tax 
-exemptions-for-religious-institutions/ [https://perma.cc/AG9F-UE7B]; Felix Salmon, Does 
Your Church Ban Gay Marriage? Then It Should Start Paying Taxes, FUSION (June 29, 2015, 
12:24 PM), http://fusion.net/story/158096/does-your-church-ban-gay-marriage-then-it-should 
-start-paying-taxes/ [https://perma.cc/T547-KKXL]; Eugene Volokh, Religious Exemptions 
—A Guide for the Confused, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 24, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/03/24/religious-exemptions 
-a-guide-for-the-confused/ [https://perma.cc/49PM-2VN4]. 
 6. For example, more than 100 private religiously affiliated schools in Georgia have ex-
plicit policies prohibiting LGBT students from attending. Kim Severson, Backed by State 
Money, Georgia Scholarships Go to Schools Barring Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/education/georgia-backed-scholarships-benefit-schools 
-barring-gays.html [https://perma.cc/ZWL6-BM55]. 
 7. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015); cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“The history of DOMA’s enactment and its own text demonstrate 
that interference with the equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the 
States in the exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the federal 
statute.”). 
 8. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 9. Id. at 2607. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent follows the reasoning of Justice Alito who, during 
oral arguments, asked whether the rule endorsed in Bob Jones13 would cause schools 
that oppose same-sex marriage to lose their exemptions.14 Solicitor General Verrilli 
replied that it was “certainly going to be an issue.”15  
Is Justice Kennedy correct? Or do religions need to worry about the eventuality 
that Chief Justice Roberts points to? Those who worry that Obergefell threatens 
conservative religions’ tax exemptions may sound alarmist.16 There certainly are 
same-sex marriage supporters who argue that religious organizations that oppose 
same-sex marriage should lose their exemptions.17 They assert that, if a religion op-
poses same-sex marriage, the government “should certainly not bend over backwards 
to give [it] the privilege of tax exemption.”18  
Moreover, there is a growing view that Obergefell represents not the end of an era 
but a dawning of a new era of constitutional doctrine. This view has been adopted 
and espoused by such eminent constitutional law scholars as Kenji Yoshino and 
Laurence Tribe. In Professor Tribe’s recent essay,19 he stated we are now entering a 
new era of protections for previously marginalized groups. He calls this view of 
constitutional protections “equal dignity.”20 Justice Kennedy, according to Professor 
Tribe, “tightly wound the double helix of Due Process and Equal Protection into a 
doctrine of equal dignity.”21 If Professor Tribe is correct, then the subsidiary 
questions regarding religious freedom asked by the dissent will need to be answered.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 577 (1983) (mapping a public policy 
exception on to the tax-exempt rules which would provide “private schools that prescribe and 
enforce racially discriminatory admissions standards on the basis of religious doctrine” fail to 
qualify as tax-exempt organizations). 
 14. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556), http:// 
www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/14-556q1_7l48.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/2BNZ-EN3J]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., W. James Antle III, How the Supreme Court’s Gay Marriage Ruling Could 
Destroy the United Methodist Church, WEEK (July 2, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/564067 
/how-supreme-courts-gay-marriage-ruling-could-destroy-united-methodist-church [https://perma 
.cc/C8QD-WS2L]; David Lauter, Will a Religious Institution Lose Tax-Exempt Status for 
Refusing To Marry a Same-Sex Couple?, L.A. TIMES, (June 26, 2015), http://www.latimes 
.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-tax-exemptions-religious-20150626-story.html [https://perma 
.cc/Q5A5-JWPY]; Team Fix, The CNN-Telemundo Republican Debate Transcript, Annotated, 
WASH. POST: THE FIX (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the 
-fix/wp/2016/02/25/the-cnntelemundo-republican-debate-transcript-annotated/ [https://perma 
.cc/SQX7-FHEC] ( “[Question of Hugh Hewitt to Donald Trump]: Mr. Trump, Senator Cruz 
mentioned the issue that keeps me up at night, which is religious liberty. Churches, Catholic 
and Christian colleges, Catholic adoption agencies—all sorts of religious institutions fear that 
Hobby Lobby, if it’s repealed, it was a five-four decision, they’re going to have to bend their 
knee and provide morning-after pills. They fear that if Bob Jones is expanded, they will lose 
their tax exemption.”). 
 17. Salmon, supra note 5. 
 18. Salmon, supra note 5; accord Oppenheimer, supra note 5. 
 19. Tribe, supra note 3. 
 20. Id. at 17 
 21. Id. 
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Even if Obergefell marks the beginning of a constitutional equal-dignity regime, 
it is not altogether clear that the law changes substantively. Although the repercus-
sions could be manifold, here we intend to explore how Obergefell affects the tax-
exempt status of churches and religiously affiliated schools that continue to dis-
criminate on the basis of sexuality. Like the Solicitor General at oral arguments, both 
those who fear and those who celebrate the potential loss of exemption by religious 
institutions skip over the hard work of figuring out how the public policy rule would 
apply to churches and other religiously affiliated organizations that discriminate on 
the basis of sexuality.22 Instead, they merely assume that it will apply and that these 
religious organizations can and will lose their exemptions.  
This Article will focus on this intersection between the First Amendment and the 
tax law. Congress clearly has the authority to remove entities—including religious 
entities—from the purview of the tax law. Whether the IRS must remove an entity 
(e.g., whether the tax exemption is a subsidy) is not a particularly relevant inquiry 
for our discussion. We instead are focusing on the specific question derived from the 
Supreme Court that an organization can lose its tax exemption if it violates a 
fundamental public policy, even where religious beliefs demand that violation. The 
fundamental public policy rule is a diachronic concept, and it is not clear how 
Obergefell, or Professor Tribe’s proposed equal dignity regime, affects its ap-
plication. We try to answer that question.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the lens in which Tribe and 
Yoshino view Obergefell. In this Part, we do not endorse their interpretation of 
Obergefell as necessarily correct. Rather, we use their interpretation as a jumping-
off point to revisit the basis of denial of tax-exempt status for violation of public 
policy. Part II then articulates the current tax standards applied to churches and re-
ligiously affiliated schools, including the structural limitations of the tax exemption. 
Those observations motivate a further inquiry into what constitutes a fundamental 
public policy. Part III takes a pragmatic approach by applying the existing standard 
to tax exemptions for religion and religiously based educational organizations. 
Together, Parts II and III make a case for a legislative solution to the problem. Part 
IV then pivots to consider the future of the fundamental public policy if Obergefell 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. Among other things, whether and how the public policy rule applies to religious 
organizations must rely on a theory of why religious organizations are exempt. Otherwise, 
asserting that they should or should not be subject to the rule is merely that: an assertion. Cf. 
Ellen P. Aprill, Why the IRS Should Want To Develop Rules Regarding Charities and Politics, 
62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 673–74 (2012) (arguing that the IRS should develop bright-line 
rules to encourage compliance); Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and the Constitution, 78 
YALE L.J. 1285, 1288 (1969) (arguing that tax-exempt organizations are not part of the tax 
base); Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from 
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 305–06, 357–58 (1976) (“The exemption of 
nonprofit organizations from federal income taxation is neither a special privilege nor a hidden 
subsidy. Rather, it reflects the application of established principles of income taxationto 
organizations which, unlike the typical business corporation, do not seek profit.”); Daniel 
Halperin, Income Taxation of Mutual Nonprofits, 59 TAX L. REV. 133, 133 (2006) (questioning 
Bittker’s premise that there are no owners of charity); David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation 
of Exempt Organizations and Their Patrons, 67 TAX LAW. 451, 515 (2014) (proposing to 
eliminate tax exemption if organization fails certain tests). 
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is indeed the beginning of a more holistic approach by the Supreme Court. This Part 
shows the limitations of the fundamental public policy doctrine and considers three 
tiers of examination as proxies for the standard of fundamental public policy as 
established by the Supreme Court in Bob Jones. Ultimately, it finds all of those 
standards flawed in some manner once again begging for a legislative remedy.  
I. POST-OBERGEFELL EQUAL DIGNITY 
In June 2015 the Supreme Court decided the Obergefell case, holding that same-
sex couples had a fundamental right to marriage.23 The case represented an important 
enumeration of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
The Court’s opinion has been subject to critical praise. The result the Court 
reached was praised; yet, the criticism has come from the legal reasoning the Court 
used to achieve the result.24 For example, scholars questioned the majority position 
for failing to make sexual orientation a suspect class.25 
A. Expansive View of Obergefell 
Two prominent constitutional law scholars have taken an alternative approach to 
the naysayers, arguing that their criticism misses the point. Professor Kenji Yoshino 
began the discussion of placing Obergefell in context of the larger constitutional 
framework.26 Professor Yoshino, rather than focusing on the language of the opinion, 
demonstrated how the opinion “represents the culmination of a decades-long project 
that has revolutionized the Court’s fundamental rights jurisprudence.”27   
According to Yoshino, the Obergefell opinion is the move away from the current 
Glucksberg28 three-prong test that dominated the Court’s jurisprudence in the 
1990s.29 The move returns the jurisprudential test of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
Justice Harlan’s holistic inquiry first articulated in the 1960s dissent in Poe v. 
Ullman.30 
Poe dealt with a criminal ban on contraception.31 The Court avoided deciding the 
case on grounds that the case was nonjusticiable because of either standing or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015); Tribe, supra note 3, at 16; 
Howard M. Wasserman, Crazy in Alabama: Judicial Process and the Last Stand Against 
Marriage Equality in the Land of George Wallace, 110 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 1 (2015); 
Yoshino, supra note 3, at 147. 
 24. Nan D. Hunter, Interpreting Liberty and Equality Through the Lens of Marriage, 6 
CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 107, 107 (2015). 
 25. Peter Nicolas, Obergefell’s Squandered Potential, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 137, 139 
(2015). 
 26. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 147. 
 27. Tribe, supra note 3, at 16; accord Yoshino, supra note 3, at 148. 
 28. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 29. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 148–51. 
 30. 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 31. Id. at 498 (plurality opinion); Yoshino, supra note 3, at 149. 
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ripeness.32 The Court relied on a formalistic approach to the ripeness question, ignor-
ing any due process analysis. A plurality of the Court decided that because the state 
had never begun a prosecution under the statute, the issue was not ripe.33  
Justice Harlan rejected the majority avoidance of the issue by stating that the 
statute was ripe to decide on the merits.34 Justice Harlan created a more open-ended 
approach to due process jurisprudence that “weighed individual liberties against 
governmental interests in a reasoned manner.”35 Justice Harlan was advocating for 
unshackling due process jurisprudence from the tradition because the “tradition was 
itself ‘a living thing.’”36   
Justice Harlan’s approach was, obviously, rejected in the case and after the early 
1970s mostly abandoned as a mode of inquiry.37 Until Obergefell, the formalistic 
approach continued to gain a stronger foothold, culminating with the decision of 
Washington v. Glucksberg.38 The Glucksberg approach adopted by the Court tied due 
process liberty to tradition and required a “‘careful description’ of the asserted 
fundamental liberty interest.”39 The test established by Glucksberg is a three-prong 
test involving tradition, specificity, and negative inquiry.40 
Professor Yoshino situates Obergefell in the larger Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence and signals a potential shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence. By 
Justice Kennedy harking back to Poe, “it will be much harder to invoke Glucksberg 
as binding precedent.”41 Thus, from Professor Yoshino’s perspective, Obergefell re-
tains Glucksberg’s requirements of “tradition.”42 The difference, in Yoshino’s opin-
ion, is that tradition is a much less prevalent factor than under Glucksberg.  
The dissent in Obergefell recognized this goal of Justice Kennedy’s shift. Justice 
Alito addressed the issue head on by stating that “only those rights that are ‘“deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”’” should be upheld under the Due 
Process Clause.43 This required the majority in Obergefell to respond to the dissent’s 
concern regarding untethering the standard from the objective Glucksberg rule. 
“Without an ostensibly constraining test like the one proposed by Glucksberg, these 
conservatives worry, substantive due process will run riot, with outcome-driven 
judges inventing new fundamental rights as it strikes their fancy.”44 Yoshino dis-
misses the conservative comparison of Obergefell to Lochner, through a limiting 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. Poe, 367 U.S. at 503–09; Yoshino, supra note 3, at 149. 
 33. Poe, 367 U.S. at 508; see also Andrew B. Schroeder, Keeping Police Out of the Bed-
room: Justice John Marshall Harlan, Poe v. Ullman, and the Limits of Conservative Privacy, 
86 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1045–46 (2000). 
 34. Poe, 367 U.S. at 522–24 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 35. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 150. 
 36. Id. (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 37. Tribe, supra note 3, at 16. 
 38. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 39. Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). 
 40. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 162. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 162–63. 
 43. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2640 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721). 
 44. Tribe, supra note 3, at 17–18. 
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lens.45 By only applying the broader rule when a group demonstrates subordination, 
the Lochner comparison can be avoided. For example, Obergefell was to address the 
subordination of LGBT individuals in the context of marriage.46 Professor Yoshino 
defines this constraint as an “antisubordination principle.”47 This is a cautious way 
to cast Obergefell as a shift from Glucksberg to Poe.   
Professor Tribe then advances Professor Yoshino’s interpretation of Obergefell 
through a view of the decision in even more expansive terms.48 He argues “that 
Obergefell’s chief jurisprudential achievement is to have tightly wound the double 
helix of Due Process and Equal Protection into a doctrine of equal dignity.”49 Under 
this view, Obergefell is not the last word on this issue, but the first. 
The new orthodoxy that Professor Tribe envisions after Obergefell is one that 
protects “all individuals . . . against the specter of coerced conformity.”50 He provides 
examples of how equal dignity would play out on a go-forward basis. For example, 
equal dignity would portend the end of discrimination based on sexual orientation in 
areas like employment or housing.51  
Most importantly for our purposes, he provides an example of how equal dignity 
would apply to Kim Davis’s opposition to marriage equality.52 Kim Davis is a 
Kentucky county clerk who would not issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples 
because it violated her religious dogma.53 The federal court for the Eastern District 
of Kentucky issued an order compelling her to issue licenses.54 She continued to defy 
the court by not issuing any licenses.55 At that time, she was jailed for contempt, and 
her clerks issued licenses that may or may not be valid under Kentucky law.56 
Professor Tribe argues that the Obergefell decision does nothing to limit 
                                                                                                                 
 
 45. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 170–71. 
 46. Tribe, supra note 3, at 18; Yoshino, supra note 3, at 175. 
 47. Yoshino, supra note 3, at 179. 
 48. Tribe, supra note 3, at 19. 
 49. Id. at 17 (emphasis in original). 
 50. Id. at 30 (emphasis in original). 
 51. Id. The government has begun to hint that it is moving this direction. In March 2016, 
the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission announced that it had filed its first two 
“sex discrimination suits based on sexual orientation.” Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC Files First Suits Challenging Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
as Sex Discrimination, Mar. 1, 2016, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom 
/release/3-1-16.cfm [https://perma.cc/F22E-QTW8]. 
 52. Tribe, supra note 3, at 30; David J. Herzig & Faisal Kutty, The Kim Davis Debacle 
Exposes the Limits of Religious Liberty, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2015, 5:05 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/david-herzig/kim-davis-law-religion_b_8124466.html [https:// 
perma.cc/8FNS-KBB9]. 
 53. Herzig & Kutty, supra note 52. 
 54. Alan Blinder & Tamar Lewin, Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail over Deal on Same-
sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-davis 
-same-sex-marriage.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/PBN6-V6HA]. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Sandhya Somashekhar, Judge: Kim Davis May Keep Her Name off Marriage 
Licenses, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post 
-nation/wp/2016/02/10/judge-kim-davis-may-keep-her-name-off-marriage-licenses/ [https:// 
perma.cc/GBW4-SWFV]. 
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individuals’ First Amendment rights to voice their personal objections.57 Whether 
they are an agent of the government or not is inconsequential. However, the doctrine 
of equal dignity would “prohibit[] them from acting on those objections . . . in a way 
that demeans or subordinates LGBT individuals and their families by preventing 
them from giving legal force to their marriage vows.”58 
Through the lens of Professors Tribe and Yoshino, Obergefell represents the 
beginning of a new constitutional paradigm. Through this approach, the Fourteenth 
Amendment becomes more prominent. Unlike most of the critique of the decision, 
Professors Tribe and Yoshino seem to be framing Obergefell within the historic juris-
prudence and within the context of dissents.  
B. Support of Expansive View Through Oral Argument and Decision 
Plenty of anecdotal evidence exists supporting the way in which Tribe and 
Yoshino situate Obergefell. The larger frame of Obergefell echoes the concerns of 
dissenting Justices in both their opinions and oral arguments. During oral arguments, 
the Justices picked up on the concern about the balance between the First 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.59 This priority manifests in two situa-
tions. The first is within the context of the religious freedom of churches themselves, 
and the second is in the context of religious freedom for religiously affiliated 
organizations, including schools. 
Justice Scalia raised the first issue when he asked whether a minister would “not 
have to conduct same-sex marriages.”60 Ms. Bonauto, the advocate for the Obergefell 
plaintiffs, stated, “If they do not want to, that is correct. I believe that is affirmed 
under the First Amendment.”61 Although under Professor Tribe’s analysis that is not 
entirely clear. 
Chief Justice Roberts raised the second issue. After restating that clergy would 
not have to perform the same-sex marriage,  he followed up with the harder question 
of “[w]ould a religious school that has married housing be required to afford such 
housing to same-sex couples?”62 
Solicitor General Verrilli responded by deferring initially to the actual decision 
the Court would render, which, according to Professor Tribe and Yoshino, is more 
expansive than the Solicitor General expected during oral argument.63 Then the 
Solicitor General stated the answer would “depend on how States work out the bal-
ance between their civil rights laws . . . and how they decide what kinds of accom-
modations they are going to allow.”64 
Pressing the issue, Justice Alito asked whether the rule endorsed in Bob Jones65 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. Tribe, supra note 3, at 30. 
 58. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 59. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 23 ll. 12–18.  
 60. Id. at 27 ll. 8–10. 
 61. Id. at 27 ll. 11–13. 
 62. Id. at 36 ll. 4–9. 
 63. Id. at 36–37. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 461 U.S. 574 (1983); see supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
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would cause schools that oppose same-sex marriage to lose their exemptions.66 
Solicitor General Verrilli replied that it was “certainly going to be an issue.”67  
The issues presented in the oral argument were echoed in the dissents of the 
opinion. First, Chief Justice Roberts cautioned that “the tax exemptions of some 
religious institutions would be in question if they opposed same-sex marriage. . . . 
Unfortunately, people of faith can take no comfort in the treatment they receive from 
the majority today.”68 The majority decision disagreed, stating that 
it must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious 
doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, 
by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The First 
Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given 
proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling 
and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations 
to continue the family structure they have long revered.69  
However, Professors Tribe and Yoshino do not take as narrow of a view. Under equal 
dignity the religious organizations have freedom to determine the contours of their 
faith. Nothing in the equal dignity analysis would impact the freedom of expression 
nor the freedom of association. It is not until those beliefs bleed into the public sphere 
that the constitutional doctrine would override that preference.  
Their view seems to echo Chief Justice Robert’s dissent, in which he asserted that 
[t]oday’s decision, for example, creates serious questions about religious 
liberty. . . .  
Respect for sincere religious conviction has [resulted in] accommo-
dations for religious practice. The majority’s decision imposing same-
sex marriage cannot, of course, create any such accommodations. The 
majority graciously suggests that religious believers may continue to 
“advocate” and “teach” their views of marriage. The First Amendment 
guarantees, however, the freedom to “exercise” religion. Ominously, that 
is not a word the majority uses.70  
Similarly, in his dissent, Justice Thomas wrote that  
[r]eligious liberty is about more than just the protection for “religious 
organizations and persons . . . as they seek to teach the principles that are 
so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths.” Religious liberty is 
about freedom of action in matters of religion generally, and the scope 
of that liberty is directly correlated to the civil restraints placed upon 
religious practice.71 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 14, at 38. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. at 2607 (majority opinion). 
 70. Id. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
 71. Id. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (omission in original) (citation omitted) (quoting 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607 (majority opinion)). 
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Justice Roberts follows up the specific example of religion with the second-order 
problem facing religious schools.  
Hard questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in ways 
that may be seen to conflict with the new right to same-sex marriage—
when, for example, a religious college provides married student housing 
only to opposite-sex married couples, or a religious adoption agency 
declines to place children with same-sex married couples. Indeed, the 
Solicitor General candidly acknowledged that the tax exemptions of 
some religious institutions would be in question if they opposed same-
sex marriage. There is little doubt that these and similar questions will 
soon be before this Court. Unfortunately, people of faith can take no 
comfort in the treatment they receive from the majority today.72 
How would then equal dignity affect the tax exemptions of either religions or 
religious based schools? We will next explore the rationale for the tax exemption. It 
will become evident in the evolution of the boundaries of the exemption, that the 
post-Obergefell view espoused by Professors Tribe and Yoshino could prove dele-
terious to discriminatory tax-exempt entities. 
II. TAX-EXEMPTION OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 
Even if Obergefell introduced equal dignity as a new constitutional principle, it 
did not single-handedly eliminate homophobia and discrimination.73 In the broader 
legal landscape, there is no consistent impediment to private (as opposed to gov-
ernment) discrimination. Neither the federal government nor the governments of 
nearly half of the states protects LGBT employees from discrimination based on their 
sexual orientation, for example.74  
And employment is not the only area of life where LGBT individuals can face 
legal discrimination. According to the Southern Education Foundation, at least 115 
private grade schools in Georgia have “explicit, severe anti-gay policies or belong to 
state and national private school associations that promote anti-gay policies and 
practices among their members.”75 At many of these schools, any student’s 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. Id. at 2625–26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 73. See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Marriage Equality, Workplace Inequality: 
The Next Gay Rights Battle, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1099 (2015) (describing workplace discrimination 
post-Obergefell); Cynthia Godsoe, Perfect Plaintiffs, 125 YALE L.J. FORUM 136, 154 (2015); 
Tobias Barrington Wolff, The Three Voices of Obergefell, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2015, at 28, 31; 
David R. Wheeler, Gay Marriage and the Future of Evangelical Colleges, ATLANTIC (July 14, 
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/07/evangelical-colleges-struggle 
-gay-marriage-ruling/398306/ [https://perma.cc/LY67-BJ3X]. 
 74. Joseph William Singer, We Don’t Serve Your Kind Here: Public Accommodations 
and the Mark of Sodom, 95 B.U. L. REV. 929, 946 (2015). 
 75. S. EDUC. FOUND., ISSUE BRIEF: GEORGIA’S TAX DOLLARS HELP FINANCE PRIVATE 
SCHOOLS WITH SEVERE ANTI-GAY POLICIES, PRACTICES, & TEACHINGS 1 (2013), http://www 
.southerneducation.org/getattachment/857328be-3d6b-415f-af8b-da7bd3b75519/Georgia%E 
2%80%99s-Tax-Dollars-Help-Finance-Private-Schools.aspx [https://perma.cc/6TLN-Z73M]. 
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homosexual actions or identity are sufficient for expulsion.76 At some, merely 
supporting people who are LGBT will get a student expelled.77 
Educational institutions’ discrimination against LGBT individuals is not, 
moreover, limited to grade schools. Dozens of religiously affiliated colleges and 
universities have policies that explicitly discriminate against gay students.78 At 
Cedarville University in Ohio, for example, “the University prohibits same-sex da-
ting behaviors,” and “patterns of disregard for University standards” constitutes 
grounds for dismissal.79 The specter of dismissal is not merely hypothetical, either. 
While no families of grade-school children who “have been expelled over sexual 
orientation from a school that uses the tax scholarship program have come forward 
in Georgia,”80 in 2013, Danielle Powell was expelled from Grace University for 
“[s]exually immoral behavior, with a woman.”81 
Even though federal law has not legally proscribed discrimination on the basis of 
sexuality, religiously based institutions’ fears they will lose their tax exemptions do 
not emerge out of nothing. In 1983, the Supreme Court, in Bob Jones, approved the 
IRS’s revocation of two private schools’ tax exemptions on the basis that those 
schools discriminated against African American students.82 In doing so, it endorsed 
the extrastatutory public policy rule that the IRS had applied in determining whether 
organizations qualified as tax-exempt.83 Under this rule, an organization that violates 
an “established public policy” cannot qualify as tax-exempt under section 501(c)(3) 
of the Tax Code.84 
Though the Supreme Court endorsed the public policy rule, it did little to clarify 
                                                                                                                 
 
 76. Kim Severson, Backed by State Money, Georgia Scholarships Go to Schools Barring 
Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/education 
/georgia-backed-scholarships-benefit-schools-barring-gays.html [https://perma.cc/8J5C-Z5E9]. 
For example, the Cherokee Christian Schools student/parent handbook states that, “[i]n 
accordance with the CCS Statement of Faith and in recognition of Biblical principles, no 
‘immoral act’ or ‘identifying statements’ concerning fornication, adultery, homosexuality, 
lesbianism, bisexuality, transgender desires, or pornography, will be tolerated. Such behavior 
will constitute grounds for expulsion.” CHEROKEE CHRISTIAN SCH., ISSUE 2016.2, 
STUDENT/PARENT HANDBOOK (CCHS) 22 (2016), https://www.cherokeechristian.org/wp 
-content/uploads/2013/10/CCHS-Student-Handbook-2016-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/R736 
-NF5W]. 
 77. Severson, supra note 76. 
 78. Wheeler, supra note 73. 
 79. THE CEDARVILLE EXPERIENCE, 2015-16 STUDENT HANDBOOK 12, 25 (2015), http:// 
publications.cedarville.edu/brochures/studentlife/studenthandbook/files/assets/common/downloads 
/publication.pdf [https://perma.cc/D429-UC2L].  
 80. Severson, supra note 76. 
 81. Allie Grasgreen, Expelled for Sexuality, and Sent a Bill, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 13, 
2013), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/06/13/student-expelled-being-gay-and-charged 
-6000-back-tuition-protests-online-petition [https://perma.cc/U374-JHSP]. 
 82. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 (1983). 
 83. Id. at 591–92. 
 84. Id. at 586; Benjamin Moses Leff, Tax Planning for Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA L. 
REV. 523, 550 (2014) (describing the “established public policy” rule); Philip T. Hackney, A 
Response to Professor Leff’s Tax Planning “Olive Branch” for Marijuana Dealers, 99 IOWA 
L. REV. BULL. 25, 31 (2014) (describing application of the “established public policy” rule). 
2017] A DIACHRONIC APPROACH TO BOB JONES 1187 
 
the rule’s scope.85 There is a real possibility that the Tribe and Yoshino view would 
mean that the fundamental public policy rule should be expanded to include LGBT. 
Therefore, before addressing the question of whether religions will lose their tax 
exemptions as a result of opposing same-sex marriage, we must determine whether 
churches are subject to the public policy doctrine and whether opposing same-sex 
marriage violates an established public policy. 
The Constitution requires little religious accommodation from the tax law. In spite 
of special constitutional protections religion enjoys,86 religious organizations have 
no constitutional right to exemption from taxes.87 In fact, religions do pay some 
taxes, including the unrelated business income tax.88 Courts have also recognized 
that under certain circumstances, churches can lose their tax exemptions and become 
subject to the federal income tax.89 It would appear to follow that a church that 
violated the public policy doctrine—a bedrock requirement for tax exemption—
could lose its exemption and become taxable. 
But does the United States have an established public policy of opposing 
discrimination against same-sex marriage? Broadly speaking, the IRS has used the 
public policy rule only in limited circumstances to revoke exemptions except where 
a charity acts illegally or where a school discriminates on the basis of race.90 No tax-
exempt organization has ever lost its exemption, or been refused an exemption, for 
discriminating on the basis of gender, national origin, or any other classification that 
receives heightened scrutiny.91 Moreover, although the opinion in Obergefell is 
slightly ambiguous, it does not appear to have added sexual orientation to the list of 
protected classes.92 There is no reason, then, to believe that Obergefell somehow an-
nounces a public policy so extreme and so fundamental that churches opposing same-
sex marriage will be subject to losing their tax exemptions. This Part will examine 
the evolution as well as the limitations of the doctrine.  
A. Evolution of Public Policy Doctrine 
Although Bob Jones has become an iconic case, a rare instance where 
constitutional law and tax law meet, it did not emerge, fully formed, from the head 
of the Supreme Court. Its holding reflected more than merely the procedural history 
underlying the case—in its background was a long series of executive, legislative, 
and judicial attempts to root out racial discrimination in United States education.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. See David A. Brennen, The Power of the Treasury: Racial Discrimination, Public 
Policy, and “Charity” in Contemporary Society, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389, 391 (2000). 
 86. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 9. 
 87. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990). 
 88. See S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 67–68 (1969). 
 89. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 90. See Herzig & Brunson, Tax Exemption, supra note 4, at 129. 
 91. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (finding that 
heightened scrutiny applies to laws that classify by race, national origin, alienage, or gender); 
Herzig & Brunson, Tax Exemption, supra note 4, at 129. 
 92. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 24, at 113; Kyle C. Velte, Essay, Obergefell’s Expressive 
Promise, 6 HOUS. L. REV.: OFF THE RECORD 157, 159 (2015). 
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We have previously detailed the IRS’s history with private schools that 
discriminated on the basis of race.93 While it is unnecessary here to recount the whole 
history, it is instructive to look at how and why the IRS began revoking the 
exemptions of discriminatory schools. 
After the Supreme Court declared the “separate but equal” doctrine un-
constitutional in 1954,94 some white parents turned to self-help to recreate racially 
segregated education. If public schools were going to integrate, they would maintain 
segregation by sending their children to discriminatory private schools. And because 
the private schools were not state actors, the Supreme Court’s constitutional analysis 
did not prevent them from discriminating. 
A decade later, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.95 A year later, the 
IRS stopped processing exemption applications from segregated private schools.96 
For two years, it explored the legal issues attendant to exempting discriminatory 
schools from the income tax.97 In 1967, the IRS unfroze the exemption process, an-
nouncing that it would no longer grant tax exemptions to discriminatory schools with 
sufficient involvement with the state.98 Where the school was private, though, and 
did “not have such degree of involvement with the political subdivision as has been 
determined by the courts to constitute State action for constitutional purposes,” the 
IRS determined that it did not have authority to reject the school’s exemption 
application.99 
In response, a group of African American parents in Mississippi sued the IRS to 
enjoin it from granting tax-exempt status to discriminatory schools.100 The district 
court granted their injunction, forbidding the IRS from approving applications for 
tax exemption for discriminatory schools within its jurisdiction.101 The IRS pro-
ceeded to expand on the court’s order. Not only did it implement the policy nation-
wide, but it also implemented it retrospectively.102 Henceforth, it would not approve 
applications for exemption from discriminatory private schools, but it would also 
look at private schools that had already obtained exemptions and, if they dis-
criminated on the basis of race, would revoke their exemptions. 
Still, a discriminatory private school will not automatically lose its exemption. 
Before that could happen, two conditions precedent would have to occur. First, the 
government would have to establish that eliminating discrimination against LGBT 
individuals had become a fundamental public policy. Then the IRS would have to 
choose to implement that policy by revoking discriminatory schools’ exemptions. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 93. Herzig & Brunson, Tax Exemption, supra note 4, at 126–29. 
 94. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 95. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 96. Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D.D.C. 1970) (per curiam). 
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 100. Id. at 1129. 
 101. Id. at 1140. 
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B. What Is a “Fundamental Public Policy,” Anyway? 
While the Supreme Court held that the IRS could constitutionally revoke a tax-
exempt organization’s exemption if that organization violated a “fundamental public 
policy,” it did not provide any guidance on what constituted a fundamental public 
policy, the violation of which would warrant loss of exemption.103 
The Supreme Court did explain why it considered racially discriminatory private 
schools as violating a fundamental public policy. Almost thirty years earlier, the 
Supreme Court explained, it had determined in Brown v. Board of Education104 to 
strike down as unconstitutional the separate-but-equal doctrine.105 The subsequent 
“unbroken line of cases . . . establishe[d] beyond doubt this Court’s view that racial 
discrimination in education violates a most fundamental national public policy.”106  
And it was not just the judicial branch. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,107 and, from there, passed many additional laws that clearly demonstrated its 
commitment to racial nondiscrimination.108 The executive branch, through a series 
of executive orders spanning several presidential administrations, also worked to 
combat racial discrimination.109 
Under the Supreme Court’s analysis, then, the question of whether racial 
discrimination violated a fundamental public policy was easy. Three decades of 
concerted effort by all three branches of the federal government demonstrated that 
the government wanted to end racial discrimination and segregation. The Supreme 
Court did not, however, say that three decades of concerted effort was necessary to 
establish a fundamental public policy, only that it was sufficient.110 Outside of 
clarifying that racial discrimination did violate fundamental public policy, the 
Supreme Court provided the IRS with no guidance in determining what else violated 
fundamental public policy. 
In light of the lack of guidance, the IRS has responded almost exactly as it would 
be expected to respond. By and large it has not revoked or denied exemptions on 
public policy grounds. The exceptions fall broadly into two main categories: racial 
discrimination and illegality.111 
                                                                                                                 
 
 103. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 (1983). 
 104. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 105. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 592–93. 
 106. Id. at 593. 
 107. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 108. Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 594. 
 109. Id. at 594–95. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Nicholas A. Mirkay, Globalism, Public Policy, and Tax-Exempt Status: Are U.S. 
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activity. 
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1. Racial Discrimination 
Racial discrimination now represents an easy case for the IRS. The IRS has a long 
history of denying tax exemptions for racially discriminatory private schools.112 In 
fact, even while recognizing that there was no federal law preventing private schools 
from discriminating on the basis of race, the IRS determined that “the policy of the 
United States is to discourage discrimination in such schools.”113 In furtherance of 
this policy, the IRS refused to allow racially discriminatory schools to enjoy the 
benefits of tax exemption.114 
The IRS did more than merely revoke or deny the exemptions of discriminatory 
private schools, though—it required schools to affirmatively disavow racial dis-
crimination. In 1971, it announced that “a school not having a racially nondiscrimi-
natory policy as to students is not ‘charitable’ within the common law concepts re-
flected in sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the Code and in other relevant Federal 
statutes and accordingly does not qualify as an organization exempt from Federal 
income tax.”115 A year later, the IRS built on its requirement for racially 
nondiscriminatory policies. For a private school to qualify as tax-exempt, it not only 
had to have such a policy, but it also had to publicize the policy.116 Finally, the IRS 
required evidence that the private school actually operated under its non-
discrimination policy.117 
The Supreme Court explicitly adopted the IRS’s fundamental public policy rules 
regarding racial discrimination.118 And the adoption of racial discrimination as 
violating fundamental public policy, and therefore incompatible with a tax exemp-
tion, was not limited to the judicial branch. When a federal district court found that 
private clubs could discriminate on the basis of race and keep their tax exemptions,119 
Congress legislatively overruled the court, requiring that a club would not qualify as 
tax-exempt if it had a written policy allowing for discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, or religion.120 Each of the three branches of government recognized racial 
discrimination as violative of public policy, and thus as preventing the tax exemption 
of a discriminatory organization that would otherwise qualify as tax-exempt. 
2. Illegality 
Just as the Supreme Court recognized that opposing racial discrimination was not 
the government’s sole public policy goal, the IRS has recognized that it can reach 
beyond racial discrimination in evaluating whether an organization qualifies as 
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exempt.121 But the only areas in which the IRS appears to have expanded the funda-
mental public policy reach have been in the area of illegality. 
What kind of illegal behavior will the IRS deem to violate public policy? A wide 
range, it turns out. In some cases, the illegality is both obvious and egregious. For 
example, a hospital that violates the Medicare and Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse 
Law, commonly known as the anti-kickback statute, does not qualify as tax-exempt 
according to the IRS.122 Similarly, a cooperative formed to facilitate the sale of 
marijuana between members (in violation of federal, though not state, law) did not 
qualify for tax-exempt status because its illegal activities violated a fundamental 
public policy.123 
Though both examples represent significant violations of law, the IRS can invoke 
the public policy requirement for less serious violations. In one case, it revoked the 
exemption of a nonprofit animal shelter and sanctuary.124 The president of the 
organization had been convicted of misdemeanor cruelty to animals and later had 
pleaded guilty to felony cruelty to animals.125 Neither, though, appears to have been 
the motivating factor in revoking the organization’s tax exemption; rather, the 
organization had failed to file the required information reporting and had refused to 
respond to IRS inquiries.126 Failure to file alone would have been sufficient for the 
organization to lose its tax exemption.127 The IRS’s invocation of the public policy 
requirement served as a backstop to its more technical disqualification for failure to 
file a return. The fact that the public policy portion of the revocation serves princi-
pally as a backstop, combined with the lack of any guidance about the relevance of 
whether a crime is a misdemeanor or a felony, means that the IRS’s decision here 
provides almost no guidance about the contours of illegality and public policy.  
In addition to the uncertainty that remains about whether the severity of a crime 
affects whether it violates fundamental public policy, the IRS has muddied the waters 
about whether, for public policy purposes, illegality is limited to illegal acts. In a 
number of instances, the IRS has denied an organization’s exemption request, not 
because the organization acts illegally, but because it advocates actions that would 
violate the law. These violative actions range from promoting world peace through 
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civil disobedience128 to educating the public about polygamy and empowering 
polygamous families.129 
In part, the fact that the IRS has not clarified the contours of the fundamental 
public policy rule can be laid at the feet of the Supreme Court, which merely an-
nounced the rule, but also did not provide any guidance about how to determine what 
constituted a fundamental public policy.130 Since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bob Jones, moreover, the courts have done virtually nothing to clarify the 
fundamental public policy rule. 
That is not to say that courts have ignored the public policy rule—they mention it 
frequently when adjudicating questions of the IRS’s wrongful denial or revocation 
of an organization’s tax-exempt status.131 In the vast majority of cases that mention 
the public policy rule, though, the opinion merely mentions public policy as one of 
the requirements for tax exemption.132 
Even where courts could easily and uncontroversially reach the question of 
fundamental public policy, they remain hesitant to do so. In Mysteryboy 
Incorporation v. Commissioner,133 for example, the Tax Court reviewed the IRS’s 
denial of tax-exempt status to Mysteryboy. Mysterboy was formed to research “the 
pros and cons of decriminalizing natural consensual sexual behaviors between adults 
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and underagers and decriminalizing what is defined as child pornography,” as well 
as to lobby for such decriminalization.134 The IRS rejected Mysteryboy’s application 
on the grounds that its purposes were “contrary to a fundamental public policy.”135 
Although the Supreme Court never mentioned promoting pedophilia and child 
pornography as violating a fundamental public policy, it seems like an uncontro-
versial classification. Federal law explicitly criminalized child pornography in 
1977,136 and, in subsequent years, Congress broadened the scope of federal law.137 
While the Tax Court ultimately upheld the IRS’s denial of tax-exempt status, though, 
it did so on the basis that Mysteryboy had failed to carry its burden of demonstrating 
that it was organized and operated for permissible purposes, not because it violated 
a fundamental public policy.138 
Similarly, in Synanon Church v. United States, the court reviewed the IRS’s 
revocation of Synanon’s tax-exempt status.139 Synanon was originally founded to 
rehabilitate drug addicts.140 It subsequently expanded into other endeavors, including 
distributing farmers’ goods, developing real estate, performing investment 
counseling, and training security forces.141 
Along with Synanon’s new business ventures, it appears to have engaged in both 
fiscal improprieties and violence against its perceived enemies.142 The violence dis-
turbed the judge, who found it “disturbing” and “serious.”143 Nonetheless, although 
the IRS argued that fundamental public policy prohibited Synanon from qualifying 
as tax-exempt, the court chose not to ground its opinion on public policy.144 Although 
it believed that dictum in Bob Jones clearly indicated that applying the public policy 
rule to Synanon’s violence “would have been proper,” it reluctantly declined to apply 
the public policy rule.145 Rather, it found that Synanon’s suit had to be dismissed 
(and the IRS’s revocation thus upheld) because Synanon committed fraud upon the 
court.146 
 As is evident from this discussion, even the clearest portion of the fundamental 
public policy requirement—the illegality aspect—would benefit from significant 
clarification. The IRS claims authority to reject or revoke the tax-exempt status of 
any organization that violates the law.147 It is, however, far from clear that the IRS 
should treat illegality as a bright-line disqualification. Illegality is not the equivalent 
of immorality.  
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The problematic approach currently taken by the IRS is that there is a long history 
in the United States of civil disobedience as a morally justified “conscientious 
violation of the law as a protest over an unjust law or governmental policy.”148 
Abolitionists deliberately flouted the law in opposing slavery.149 Toward the end of 
his life, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. called for civil disobedience to call attention to 
the evils of racism, poverty, and unemployment.150 
We do not know, however, how the public policy doctrine would have applied to 
abolitionists; the abolition movement occurred prior to the federal income tax, and 
therefore prior to the existence of tax-exempt organizations. And the civil rights 
movement’s civil disobedience is similarly inapposite, both because the disobedience 
was generally performed by individuals, not tax-exempt organizations, and because 
it occurred prior to the Supreme Court’s adoption of the fundamental public policy 
standard. 
Even today, though, civil disobedience occurs. And sometimes tax-exempt 
organizations participate. Recently, in response to the Obama administration’s de-
portations of undocumented Central American immigrants, dozens of churches have 
revived the sanctuary movement.151 In violation of federal law, these churches 
(which are exempt from taxation) provide a refuge for immigrants facing 
deportation.152 
In the past, organizations that encouraged civil disobedience (even if they 
themselves did not participate in it) have had their applications for tax exemption 
rejected by the IRS on public policy and illegality grounds.153 Illegality in the service 
of civil disobedience is substantively different, though, than illegality in the pursuit 
of selfish ends. Where the latter certainly violates public policy, it is not clear that 
the former does. Public policy may favor civil disobedience, notwithstanding that it 
necessarily involves violating the law.154 In fact, Dr. King asserted that, just as people 
have a moral obligation to obey just laws, they have “a moral responsibility to 
disobey unjust laws.”155 And that moral obligation complicates the question of 
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whether illegality is an appropriate bright-line rule for determining fundamental 
public policy. 
Courts’ hesitation to apply the fundamental public policy rule is understandable. 
The Supreme Court emphasized that it should only be applied “only where there is 
no doubt that the organization’s activities violate fundamental public policy.”156 But 
courts’ understandable skittishness at applying the rule means they have done 
nothing to clarify the muddy waters in which the IRS currently operates. It also 
means that neither the IRS nor the courts have provided tax-exempt organizations 
with any guidance as to what “fundamental public policy” means outside of the 
context of racial discrimination in education. 
C. But the IRS Does Not Have To Enforce the Fundamental Public Policy Rule 
Bob Jones does not mandate that the IRS revoke the tax exemptions of entities 
that violate a fundamental public policy. In fact, outside of the context of racially 
discriminatory schools, the IRS has rarely (if ever) revoked an exemption for vio-
lation of public policy and has only denied exemptions on public policy grounds in 
rare instances, as discussed above.157 The rare instances where the IRS has revoked 
or denied exemptions on public policy grounds certainly do not represent a complete 
list of behaviors that violate public policy.158 And yet the IRS has not revoked the 
tax exemptions of organizations that violate other fundamental public policies. How 
can that be? 
There are a handful of reasons that the IRS can ignore tax-exempt organizations’ 
bad behavior. The first is, the Supreme Court’s decision in Bob Jones did not man-
date the loss of exemption. Rather, it confirmed that revocations for the violation of 
fundamental public policies was constitutionally permissible. Though the IRS can 
revoke exemptions, the Supreme Court did not create a constitutional obligation for 
it to do so, and Congress has never explicitly required the IRS to enforce the public 
policy rule either. 
This lack of constitutional or statutory obligation matters. It buttresses the fact 
that, both as a legal and a practical matter, the IRS has complete discretion to not 
enforce the fundamental public policy rule. How does the IRS have such un-
constrained discretion when it comes to not enforcing the public policy rule?  
1. Administrative Discretion 
In the first instance, the IRS enjoys broad administrative discretion when it comes 
to choosing not to enforce rules.159 When the Supreme Court recognized the right of 
the executive branch to refuse to enforce laws, it grounded that right in three main 
considerations.160 It allowed an agency to balance factors, including whether 
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enforcement is a good use of finite agency resources.161 It recognized that refusing 
to act does not exercise coercive power.162 And it acknowledged that an agency’s 
refusal to act was closely related to the decision not to indict, a decision that had long 
been granted to the executive branch.163 
Even those proponents of same-sex marriage who want religions that oppose it to 
lose their exemptions are powerless to effect that change. Only the IRS can revoke 
an organization’s tax-exempt status.164 As a federal administrative agency, the IRS 
is part of the executive branch and, as part of the government, its decisions are subject 
to judicial review.165 As a result, proponents of same-sex marriage could in theory 
lobby the president to appoint an IRS commissioner who would prioritize revoking 
religions’ exemptions, or they could attempt to litigate. Neither move would be 
effective, though.  
The executive has a long history of using the IRS to do its bidding. From President 
John F. Kennedy in the 1960s, to the Nixon Enemies List in the 1970s, to alleged 
misconduct in the 1990s, politicians are happy to use the IRS to do their dirty work.166 
To ensure that politics did not affect the IRS’s audit decisions, in 1998 Congress 
passed the Restructuring and Reform Act.167 The Act established a taxpayer bill of 
rights that was intended to protect taxpayers from IRS abuses.168 Although there have 
been some anomalies, such as the recent Tea Party scandal, in general the IRS has 
demonstrated its independence from the executive.169 
Finally, the doctrine of administrative discretion—a derivative of prosecutorial 
discretion—gives the IRS “leeway to decline to enforce statutes and shields [its] 
inaction from judicial review.”170 In general, unless Congress has explicitly required 
the IRS to enforce a particular part of the tax law, courts will respect the IRS’s 
decision not to enforce it.171 Even if opposing same-sex marriage violated an estab-
lished public policy, Congress has not mandated that the IRS enforce the public 
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policy doctrine. As such, the IRS’s decision not to revoke a church’s tax exemption 
is insulated from judicial review by three layers of laws.  
Even if the IRS internally decided to revoke a religion’s exemption, it would face 
serious practical impediments. The tax law mandates that the IRS follow a 
complicated, burdensome set of procedures both to initiate and to perform a church 
audit.172 In light of the fallout of its delay in processing certain Tea Party groups’ 
exemption applications, the IRS is understandably gun-shy about acting in a way that 
could be seen as targeting conservative tax-exempt organizations on the basis of their 
beliefs.173 Even if the government were to tax churches, more than ninety percent of 
most churches’ revenue comes from member contributions, which do not constitute 
taxable income.174 The IRS would balance the criticism it could expect against the 
little, if any, additional revenue it would collect for the federal government.175 
The IRS does not enjoy unlimited administrative discretion, of course. Congress 
has the ability to expressly require the IRS to enforce the law, thus overruling its 
discretion.176 Although Congress apparently approves of the public policy rule,177 it 
has never explicitly required the IRS to enforce it.  
The Supreme Court also suggested that a court could adjudicate questions of 
agency nonenforcement where agency inaction amounts to “an abdication of its 
statutory responsibilities.”178 The Supreme Court did not define the contours of 
abdication, though, and has never revisited the question.179 Lower courts, which have 
adjudicated questions of abdication, have universally found that the agency in 
question did not abdicate its statutory responsibilities and thus did not compromise 
its administrative discretion.180 Thus, judicial doctrine shields the IRS from taxpayer 
pressure to revoke discriminatory schools’ exemptions.181 
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Ultimately, the IRS’s insulation from taxpayer pressure means that even when we 
know that protecting LGBT individuals from discrimination is a fundamental public 
policy, the IRS must affirmatively decide to revoke discriminatory schools’ 
exemptions. But, in spite of more than a decade of concerted federal effort to elimi-
nate racial discrimination in education, the IRS initially decided that it could not and 
would not do so.182 Ultimately, it took a lawsuit to motivate the IRS’s actions, actions 
which were eventually confirmed by the Supreme Court. 
2. Standing 
Likewise, courts cannot force the IRS to revoke a religious institution’s tax 
exemption. No matter how sincerely or vocally a taxpayer may want to see it done, 
an IRS decision not to revoke is immune from judicial review.183 The IRS derives its 
immunity from judicial oversight from three main requirements.  
First is the constitutional requirement that a litigant have suffered an injury in fact 
before a court has jurisdiction to hear a controversy.184 Taxpayers suffer no injury in 
fact when the IRS grants a tax exemption to a third party.185 And while the Supreme 
Court allows litigants to avoid the injury-in-fact requirement through a doctrine 
called “Establishment Clause standing,” the circumstances permitting Establishment 
Clause standing are tremendously narrow.186 Among other things, a litigant must 
show a government expenditure of money, and under the Court’s current literalistic 
view of Establishment Clause standing, an exemption from tax is not the same thing 
as direct government spending.187 
Standing represented the fundamental bar to taxpayers’ forcing the IRS to act 
here. Taxpayers—including LGBT students—lack standing to sue the IRS for its 
nonenforcement. Standing requires, among other things, a litigant who could assert 
that she had suffered an injury in fact that is traceable to the IRS’s nonenforcement.188 
A school’s discrimination against LGBT students certainly harms those students, but 
that harm is insufficient to grant LGBT students standing to challenge the IRS’s 
nonenforcement of the public policy rule. In the first instance, the injury is traceable 
to the actions of the discriminatory school, not to the IRS’s nonenforcement of the 
public policy rule. A school’s exempt status does not cause it to discriminate; while 
it perhaps subsidizes the discrimination, an injury in fact must be a concrete injury, 
not one that is conjectural or hypothetical.189 
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How did Mississippi parents’ lawsuit get past the standing bar? The court 
essentially eluded the question; though the Treasury Department, in its role as defen-
dant, contended that the plaintiffs had no standing, the court in Green v. Kennedy 
decided that it did not need to consider the question.190 Still, the court asserted that 
the plaintiffs had “standing to attack the constitutionality of statutory provisions 
which they claim provides an unconstitutional system of benefits and matching 
grants” that supported discriminatory schools.191 It referred to Coffey v. State 
Educational Finance Commission,192 another district court case, as precedent for its 
view on standing.193 
In that case, a class of African American parents in Mississippi challenged the 
state’s provision of tuition grants to children who lived in school districts that had 
desegregated.194 Though the court in that case did not analyze standing, it appears to 
have assumed plaintiffs had standing. It determined that the tuition grants per-
petuated segregation and enjoined the state from providing the grants.195 
There is a substantive difference between Green and Coffey, though: in Coffey, 
the state actually expended money, while in Green, the challenged subsidy was 
merely a tax benefit. Economically, of course, the two are identical—there is no 
substantive difference between the state giving parents $1000, which they will then 
pay to a school, and the state reducing the school’s taxes by $1000. Either way, the 
school has an additional $1000 that it can use. 
But economics notwithstanding, the courts view the two as different, at least as a 
basis for standing. In 1968, the Supreme Court created “taxpayer standing,” a small 
exception to the strict “injury in fact” standing requirement.196 Under certain circum-
stances, taxpayer standing allows taxpayers to challenge tax laws as unconstitutional, 
even if they are not directly harmed by the law in question.197 However, taxpayer 
standing has generally been limited to questions of religious establishment, and, 
more importantly, requires both taxing and spending.198 That is, a mere tax subsidy 
is insufficient to overcome the personalized injury standing requirement.199  
Moreover, the fact that the Green court found standing has no ongoing legal 
significance. A district court opinion not only does not provide binding precedent for 
courts outside of its jurisdiction, it also does not bind its own district, or even the 
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judge herself in future cases.200 The fact that once taxpayers were able to judicially 
force the IRS to revoke discriminatory schools’ tax exemptions is merely an accident 
of history, then. But it does nothing to support the idea that taxpayers currently have 
that ability. In fact, in a subsequent suit by African American parents claiming that 
the IRS was not doing a good enough job at denying tax exemptions to discriminatory 
private schools, the Supreme Court found that, notwithstanding Green, the plaintiff 
parents had no standing to bring the suit.201 
Of course, there is one significant difference between 1970, when the Court 
created taxpayer standing, and today: in 1970, the IRS had decided it did not have 
authority to revoke a private school’s tax exemption unless the school had sufficient 
connections with the government. Today, the Supreme Court has made clear that 
revoking a private school’s tax exemption for violating a fundamental public policy 
is constitutionally permissible. Still, knowing that it can act and actually deciding to 
act are two fundamentally different things. That is, even knowing it has the ability to 
revoke a private school’s exemption does not provide an incentive for the IRS to do 
so. 
Second, even if taxpayers had standing, courts generally cannot provide the kind 
of relief that would be necessary to force the IRS to act. The Declaratory Judgments 
Act, which generally allows courts to “declare the rights and other legal relations of 
any interested party,” explicitly carves out taxes from courts’ declaratory judgment 
authority.202 Mirroring the limitations in the Declaratory Judgments Act, the Tax 
Anti-Injunction Act prevents suits seeking to enjoin the assessment or collection of 
taxes.203 Even if taxpayers had Establishment Clause standing, then, these laws 
would insulate the IRS from outside pressure to revoke churches’ exemptions.204 
III. FUNDAMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES 
Based on the existing rules as established and as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court, the practical constraints, and additional constitutional impediments, it is un-
likely that the IRS would have to navigate that a revocation of a religious organiza-
tion’s exemption for discriminating against LGBT individuals would occur. These 
constitutional hurdles are not insurmountable, of course. The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that religiously affiliated organizations can lose their tax exemptions, 
and lower courts have allowed the IRS to revoke churches’ exemptions, albeit less 
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frequently.205 Still, there are constitutional limits: in general, the government cannot 
impose its will on church ecclesiastical decisions, either directly or indirectly.206 
While the government can impose conditions on benefits it grants, it cannot “grant a 
benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if 
the government may withhold that benefit altogether.”207  
In this Part we will utilize the existing pragmatic frame as we examine whether 
Obergefell facially changes the analysis. Here we rely on the historic context of the 
evolution of the fundamental public policy doctrine as well as the limited application. 
We think it is useful to compare side by side the rationales for retention in the context 
of religion and religiously based educational institutions. In the next Part, we will 
change the frame by discussing possible outcomes and limitations should a more 
expansive view of the doctrine take hold.  
A. Religiously Affiliated Organizations and Fundamental Public Policy 
The question of whether religiously affiliated organizations can lose their tax 
exemptions for violating a fundamental public policy is, ultimately, an easy question 
based on the existing rules but a potentially harder question based on religious liberty 
concerns. Almost instantly after the IRS introduced the fundamental public policy 
requirement, the question arose whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment circumscribed the IRS’s ability to revoke the tax exemption of a reli-
giously affiliated discriminatory private school.208 The Supreme Court, in Bob Jones, 
adopted the IRS’s view that violation of a fundamental public policy (here, 
antidiscrimination in education) was incompatible with tax exemption.209 It went on 
to hold that the government’s interest in eradicating racial discrimination in educa-
tion was sufficiently compelling that it outweighed the burden on religious practice 
the schools faced in losing their exemptions.210 As long as a right rose to the level of 
a fundamental public policy, then the balance of the scales would tip to protecting 
that right over the religious liberty of the school. 
Using the Supreme Court’s analysis in Bob Jones, it is clear that there is 
theoretically no constitutional impediment to revoking a religious university’s tax 
exemption if that university discriminates against LGBT students and such dis-
crimination violates a fundamental public policy. The Supreme Court explicitly 
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blessed the IRS’s ability to revoke even a religious organization’s tax-exempt status 
for such violation.211 Moreover, even if a school has a sincere religious mandate to 
oppose homosexuality, as long as the government’s interest in eliminating such 
discrimination was sufficiently compelling, the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment may not protect the tax exemption.  
Cedarville University then takes the position that “[w]e believe that God’s design 
at Creation for sexual desire and orientation is within the bounds of a marriage union 
between a man and a woman.”212 If the IRS and ultimately the Supreme Court believe 
that same-sex marriage is a fundamental public policy, then the tax exemption of 
Cedarville University could be revoked. Essentially, this is Bob Jones in same-sex 
marriage. The Supreme Court recognized that, while paying taxes imposes a burden, 
the burden of taxpaying does not necessarily prevent the exercise of religion.213 
B. Churches and Fundamental Public Policy 
In some ways, churches present an easier question: it seems largely 
uncontroversial that, even if religiously affiliated tax-exempt organizations should 
lose their tax exemptions for violating fundamental public policies, churches should 
not. Among the rights it enshrines in the Constitution, the First Amendment provides 
expressly for the free exercise of religion.214 If free exercise means anything, one 
could argue, it must mean that churches enjoy an extra level of protection from state 
infringement.215 
The idea that the Free Exercise Clause provides additional rights to corporate 
churches, as opposed to the body of believers, turns out to be controversial, though. 
Some scholars argue that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment grants 
broad autonomy for churches, subject to being overridden “only for grave reasons of 
state.”216 Other scholars, uncomfortable with church autonomy, argue that the Free 
Exercise Clause “applies exclusively to individuals,” not to churches.217 Still others 
fall somewhere between these two extreme positions: while the religion clauses do 
apply to churches, they say, churches do not have unlimited autonomy from the 
state.218 
Adjudicating between these various views of how the religion clauses apply to 
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churches is beyond the scope of this Article. Moreover, it is generally unimportant 
in answering whether the fundamental public policy rule can apply to churches. 
Scholars who understand the First Amendment as providing for church autonomy 
would clearly argue that church exemptions should not rest on following funda-
mental public policy.219  
Current Supreme Court jurisprudence sides with these scholars, recognizing that 
churches have specific rights beyond the merely associational enjoyed by both reli-
gious and secular groups.220 The idea that churches merely have the same associa-
tional rights as any other organization is, according to the Supreme Court, “hard to 
square with the text of the First Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to 
the rights of religious organizations.”221 
If the Supreme Court were to revisit its view, though, and find no institutional 
rights granted by the religion clauses of the First Amendment, the fundamental public 
policy rule would still be unlikely to apply to church tax exemptions. Even scholars 
who are profoundly skeptical of church autonomy arguments would seem to agree 
that churches have the ability to define their own doctrine and beliefs.222 They merely 
come to that conclusion differently than scholars who argue for church autonomy.  
Congress has also infused the tax law with some level of church autonomy. 
Although churches’ tax exemptions begin in the same Code section as the exemp-
tions of other public charities, the Code includes several provisions that exempt 
churches from requirements applicable to those other public charities. For example, 
most charitable organizations must apply to the IRS for tax-exempt status.223 
Churches, though, are exempt from the application requirement, gaining their tax 
exemption automatically by virtue of being churches.224  
The differences do not end at formation, moreover. Even after a church 
(automatically) becomes exempt, the tax law continues to treat it differently in cer-
tain significant respects. Most tax-exempt organizations must file an annual infor-
mation return with the IRS detailing certain financial information.225 For most 
organizations, moreover, tax exemption comes with a significant loss of privacy: 
they are required to make their exemption applications and their annual returns 
available, not just to the IRS, but to the public at large.226  
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Just as the tax law does not require churches to apply for exemption, it does not 
require them to file annual information returns.227 Because churches need neither file 
exemption applications nor annual information returns, they also need not provide 
financial disclosure to the public at large. 
And this exemption provided to churches was not a mere accident of history: in 
1969, the House of Representatives proposed legislation that would have required 
churches to file information returns.228 The risk galvanized churches, which lobbied 
the Senate, and ultimately preserved their exemption from the generally applicable 
filing requirement.229 
In addition to churches’ exemption from the application and filing requirements 
generally applicable to tax-exempt organizations, the Code also provides churches 
special procedural protections. To the extent the IRS wants to audit a church, it must 
jump through additional more stringent restrictions on those audits, including 
additional notice requirements, limits on the scope of what an audit can investigate, 
and limits on the length and frequency of audits.230 
The IRS appears to have largely internalized the legislative and judicial deference 
given churches. As we have discussed above, the IRS has, by and large, not invoked 
the public policy requirement to reject or revoke organizations’ exemptions.231 Even 
in the area of racial discrimination, where it has the strongest explicit mandate and 
has, in fact, revoked exemptions, it has not revoked the exemption of a single 
discriminatory church.  
Whether or not the Constitution guarantees church autonomy, then, the practical 
effect of the religion clauses, combined with judicial interpretation, legislative 
mandates, and administrative buy-in, suggests that churches need not worry about 
losing their exemptions for violating fundamental public policy. The government 
does not interfere in internal governance of religious bodies, and such bodies are 
therefore protected from state-level repercussions (such as losing their tax 
exemptions) in a way that religiously affiliated schools and other charitable 
institutions are not. 
IV. EXPANSIVE FUNDAMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY 
As evident from the prior discussion, the well-accepted axiom that the IRS should 
be nothing more than a neutral collector of taxation does not reflect the actual 
position of the IRS.232 This idealistic position has been shown to be vulnerable when, 
for instance, the IRS has been influenced by the political whims of Congress or the 
President.233 Every time that the IRS has stepped outside the bounds of its identity as 
a theoretic neutral arbitrator of determining taxable income, however, there has been 
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an immediate reigning in of the agency.234 As a general rule, the IRS should not 
function as a policymaker but rather as an enforcer and administrator of the policy 
decisions of Congress. 
Yet despite that clear line of historic treatment, in Bob Jones, the Court 
acknowledged that the IRS could play a policy role, at least in overlay of the public 
policy requirement to tax-exempt organizations.235 Even at the time, this policy role 
was controversial, though: in his concurrence, Justice Powell suggested that allo-
cating this responsibility to the IRS was improper.236 Congress legislated specific 
qualification criteria for tax-exempt organizations, including churches and educa-
tional institutions. Congress did not provide for an overarching exception to the 
aforementioned charitable rules based on the IRS’s importing of value judgments to 
the analysis. If the IRS, post-Obergefell, follows the lead advocated by Professors 
Tribe and Yoshino and applies the fundamental public policy requirement dia-
chronically, then Congress or Treasury needs to implement objective criteria to de-
termine when a policy transitions into a fundamental public policy.  
Applying the fundamental public policy doctrine in a post-Obergefell paradigm 
will prove problematic without a framework for determining the boundaries of what 
constitutes a fundamental public policy. Line-drawing exercises can be complicated 
to perform in a principled way.237 With no guidance beyond the vagaries that 
currently define fundamental public policies, judges will be forced to interject their 
own moral judgment in the process. And a judge’s own moral judgment is ultimately 
arbitrary and unpredictable: would-be tax-exempt organizations have no way of 
knowing ex ante what a judge will see as violating fundamental public policy. The 
rule, then, will necessarily punish bad actors, rather than discouraging tax-exempt 
organizations from acting badly. Compliance with this kind of inchoate rule borders 
on the impossible.  
Without a bright-line test, the aforementioned vague rule making is compounded 
in two distinct but related areas. First, the agency continues to be subject to capture 
by Congress and the executive.238 The IRS has recently faced significant backlash 
for allegedly inserting its value judgment into the granting of exemption for con-
servative social welfare organizations.239 The subsequent scandal involving 
Commissioner Lois Lerner clearly signals that congressional intent and public 
opinion do not allow for the IRS to interject policy judgments.240 
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Additionally, not only could the IRS improperly attempt to regulate various 
charities, but entities cannot comply with an ethereal rule. The goal of the tax code 
is to encourage compliance through a clear allocation of responsibility and rules.241 
If there is no clear definition of the fundamental public policy, how can an entity 
comply with the rule? And where the exempt entity cannot understand what the 
fundamental public policy is—or even where figuring it out is too costly—the rule 
cannot do its work. If there is a fundamental public policy rule, the rule should be to 
encourage the school to not be discriminatory rather than punish a school after the 
fact. 
What are the contours of the rule the Supreme Court created in Bob Jones? No 
one really knows. That is why during oral arguments in Obergefell, Justice Alito 
wondered about the applicability of the fundamental public policy rule to same-sex 
marriage.242 This is because in Bob Jones, outside of illegality and discrimination, 
the Supreme Court created a vague standard that is not eligible for consistent appli-
cation by the IRS, other courts, or taxpayers.  
It is because of the vagueness of the future application of the fundamental public 
policy rule many argue that the result of Bob Jones is an outlier.243 As we discussed, 
one can count on one hand the number of charities that have had their charitable 
exemption revoked because they violated the public policy rule for anything other 
than racial discrimination.244 “[O]nly organizations that participated in racial dis-
crimination, advocated civil disobedience, or were involved in an illegal activity 
have lost their tax-exempt status pursuant to the public-policy doctrine.”245 If Bob 
Jones is an anomaly, charities should not be concerned with violating the public 
policy doctrine. However, we are not entirely sure that the holding of Bob Jones 
applies only to racially discriminatory schools.  
Rather, we argue that the marginalization of Bob Jones relates to a failure to be 
able to extrapolate when the doctrine would likely apply. While we believe that the 
fundamental public policy requirement reflects a real and valuable normative 
framework, we also believe that in its current vague state, it does not accomplish its 
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purpose.246 The requirement should not focus on punishing organizations that violate 
fundamental public policies. Rather, it should be designed in a manner that gives 
charities ex ante guidance, encouraging them to act in socially beneficial ways.  
The law has a simple way it could provide this ex ante guidance. Congress, the 
Treasury Department, or the courts could develop a framework to give tax-exempt 
organizations the necessary and appropriate guidance.247 In areas of the tax law simi-
lar to this, safe harbors function to facilitate the orderly administration of the tax 
laws.248 Alternatively, Congress should act in defining the rule. We believe that tax-
payers should have clear guidance on whether they are in compliance with the laws.  
We propose three potential frameworks for determining whether a tax-exempt 
organization violates public policy when it discriminates against a group of people. 
For our purposes, we have limited these options to dealing with tax-exempt organi-
zations’ discriminatory policies, primarily because discrimination was the focus of 
Bob Jones and is the focus of current battles over the application of the public policy 
rule. Certainly, nothing in our proposal would prevent the IRS from denying tax-
exempt status to entities that break the law or violate some nondiscriminatory public 
policy. Neither category of denial, however, has historically been common or 
fraught.249 If the nondiscrimination portions of the public policy requirement were to 
become more prominent, it may be worth returning to address them systemically. In 
the meantime, though, we see value in providing a heuristic for determining whether 
certain behaviors violate the public policy rule.  
Two of the frameworks we propose function as bright-line rules—albeit moveable 
bright-line rules—explaining specifically how to determine whether a tax-exempt’s 
discrimination does not trigger the safe harbor rule. The third would provide a safe 
harbor (or, more specifically, a “sure shipwreck”)250 for certain types of 
discrimination. 
In addition to cascading from least to most impactful, our proposed heuristic 
cascades from least to most fluid. The narrowest application would find a violation 
of the fundamental public policy doctrine in situations where the Supreme Court uses 
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the strict scrutiny analysis. The intermediate application would use the Civil Rights 
Act as the proxy for fundamental public policy. Finally, the broadest application 
would be utilizing the equal protection test under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Although it is administratively complicated, the IRS already applies a fifteen-part 
test to determine whether an entity is a church, so it could certainly apply the equal 
protection test here.251  
Each of these potential frameworks lines up with one branch of government: the 
courts determine which classifications will trigger strict scrutiny, Congress chooses 
which classifications will be protected by the Civil Rights Act, and the Treasury 
Department could create a blacklist of behaviors that violate the equal protection test. 
In determining the benefits and burdens of each potential safe harbor, policy makers 
could simultaneously determine which branch of government they believe is best 
suited to provide this guidance to tax-exempt organizations. 
A. Strict Scrutiny 
Over time, in the realm of constitutional review, the Supreme Court has 
established a taxonomy of three tiers of review: (i) strict scrutiny, (ii) intermediate 
scrutiny, and (iii) rational basis review.252 By using these three tiers, the Court has 
set the boundaries that create predictability in the majority of cases. “By establishing 
stable and predictable definitions of litigants’ burdens of persuasion and production, 
judicial employment of tiers of scrutiny lowers decision costs and expedites 
litigation.”253 
Although many academics have engaged in a push to eliminate the levels of 
scrutiny,254 the idea of strict scrutiny has a long and developed history. For our pur-
poses, the viability or the authenticity of the standard is not important. Rather, we 
believe the tax law could import the strict scrutiny standard to determine whether 
discrimination violates a fundamental public policy because of the doctrine’s theo-
retical underpinnings as well as the rigor in which courts apply it. 
To determine whether strict scrutiny applies, the Court applies a “test [that] 
governs challenges under the Equal Protection Clause to statutes that discriminate on 
the basis of race or other ‘suspect’ classifications.”255 In strict scrutiny a statute that 
restricts a fundamental right can only survive if it advances compelling government 
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interests.256 The Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny analysis narrowly, from 
First Amendment laws that regulate speech to racial discrimination.257 
Strict scrutiny is particularly apt for our purposes because, like fundamental 
public policy, it is diachronic. The strict scrutiny standard was first articulated in 
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.258 In Carolene Products, the 
Supreme Court reversed the Lochner-era Supreme Court by upholding economic 
regulations as “long as the law is a ‘rational’ way of furthering any ‘legitimate’ 
governmental purpose.”259 Carolene Products did not set a strict-scrutiny standard 
in stone, though. Rather, it left open the door for more robust scrutiny in the cases of 
fundamental rights and discrimination against racial minorities. 
In 1942, the Supreme Court used the heightened standard in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
where Justice Douglas wrote “strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes 
in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious 
discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals in violation of the 
constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws.”260 What began as a limited con-
stitutional doctrine affecting economic regulations with only an eye on future 
applications took hold as judicial doctrine. 
The evolution of the doctrine continued over time to include free speech and equal 
protection261 and then to racial classifications.262 The evolution of the doctrine over 
time allowed the Supreme Court to create a malleable taxonomy of classifications 
with a prescribed doctrine for examination. For example, in the 1950s, the Warren 
Court expanded the doctrine to religion as well as to voting and travel.263 From our 
perspective, the fact that as society evolved strict scrutiny also evolved from the first 
limited use related to economic regulation to a more robust protection of certain 
groups indicates the viability of the doctrine for use in determining whether a policy 
violates a fundamental public policy.  
In addition, strict scrutiny is a flexible rule. To this point, we have examined the 
growth of the rule through expansion of the protected class. However, the evolution 
of the rule has not been limited to a single dimension. In some areas, the applicability 
of strict scrutiny has declined. For example, the Court has pulled back on its 
application of strict scrutiny to the free exercise of religion. 
In Sherbert v. Verner, the Court introduced the strict scrutiny standard to laws that 
impinged on the free exercise of religion.264 In Sherbert, the Supreme Court held that 
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a restriction on unemployment benefits if you worked on Saturday was a violation of 
the plaintiff’s religious liberty as a Seventh-day Adventist.265 The Supreme Court 
required South Carolina to justify the rule under a strict-scrutiny analysis. Building 
on Sherbert, the Court began to regularly apply strict scrutiny to Free Exercise 
claims.266 
The Supreme Court then reconsidered the applicability of strict scrutiny to 
religion. In Employment Division v. Smith,267 the Supreme Court was faced with a 
similar situation as Sherbert. In Smith, the issue was denial of unemployment benefits 
based on religious beliefs. The difference was that in Smith the denial was based on 
religiously based drug use.268 The Oregon Supreme Court, based on Sherbert and the 
line of cases that followed, upheld the exemption based on free exercise of religion. 
The Supreme Court limited the applicability of strict scrutiny. Justice Scalia 
wanted to reserve strict scrutiny for laws that were racially discriminatory or cur-
tailed political speech.269 To unleash strict scrutiny on any law that anyone found 
religiously troubling would destroy society.270 Over time, the Supreme Court found 
a new equilibrium for strict scrutiny in the context of free exercise.  
The Smith decision then prompted Congress to pass the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA).271 The RFRA required the federal courts to apply the pre-
Smith rule.272 Although the Court invalidated the federal RFRA as it applied to states, 
the give and take between Congress and the Supreme Court resulted in an equilibrium 
for the application of a strict-scrutiny standard as it is related to the free exercise of 
religion.273 The rule evolved to a more modern bifurcated application. In the context 
of free exercise, strict scrutiny will apply when a statute or practice is “an improper 
attempt to target.”274 
It is important for our purposes to differentiate the Supreme Court’s use of strict 
scrutiny in the context of religious liberty and in a more general application. As we 
have seen in the evolution of the doctrine from Sherbert to Smith in the area of free 
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exercise, strict scrutiny has seen “a troubled history.”275 “In the 1970s and 1980s, 
however, the courts granted very few religion-based exemptions to generally appli-
cable laws despite applying strict scrutiny in many decisions.”276 As to religious lib-
erty claims, a study by Christopher Eisgruber and Larry Sager framed the application 
of strict scrutiny as “strict in theory but feeble in fact.”277 At the heart of the matter, 
only when a law is drafted to “intentionally target religions for discriminatory 
treatment” will it see the applicability of strict scrutiny.278  
From our perspective, it is not the applicable standard that is important as much 
as the manner of evolution of the rule. If we want to tether the application of the 
fundamental public policy rule to an ascertainable standard, then using strict scrutiny 
certainly is promising. First, it continues to evolve. The strict scrutiny doctrine is 
flexible enough to bring groups into or remove groups from the classification, but it 
changes incrementally, providing groups with some degree of certainty.  
Recently, the Supreme Court has softened its stance, stating that the fact that strict 
scrutiny applies “says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that 
determination is the job of the court applying strict scrutiny.”279 Even in its current 
state of application, the positivism of strict scrutiny would ensure compliance. 
Further, if we examine Bob Jones through this lens, the result is consistent with 
the actual outcome. We realize that with a data point of one (the Bob Jones case) 
there is a hefty amount of skepticism in this type of analysis. Nonetheless, if the 
question is whether a tax-exempt entity can maintain a racially discriminatory policy, 
then would any policy survive strict scrutiny? If we are correct, then the fundamental 
public policy doctrine would import the strict-scrutiny standard since this is a class 
affected by the standard. There is no compelling state interest in maintaining racially 
discriminatory admission standards.  
The conflating problem with the analysis is that a version of strict scrutiny would 
apply to the exercise of religious freedom. However, under Smith, laws that 
incidentally burden religion are not to receive strict scrutiny.280 Only when a statute 
“single[s] out religiously motivated conduct for governmental regulation” will we 
apply strict scrutiny.281 As long as the law is not intentionally discriminating against 
a religion, it most likely will be upheld.282  
Thus, in Bob Jones, since the conduct is not of a class that rises to strict scrutiny, 
only the racially motivated component would persist under our analysis. This ap-
proach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s view post-Smith. Other cases support 
this approach. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,283 the Supreme Court was faced 
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with the situation of discrimination based on sexual orientation.284 The Boy Scouts 
claimed free-expression rights, and the plaintiff claimed discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.285 The case was decided pre-Obergefell, and the case was not 
about tax exemption. However, consistent with our interpretation of using strict 
scrutiny as the proxy for fundamental public policy, the Supreme Court allowed the 
Boy Scouts to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.286  
However, because the boundaries are so well-defined, strict scrutiny applies to a 
narrow pool of individuals. The purpose behind the strict-scrutiny standard seems to 
be to provide a voice to disenfranchised groups that otherwise lack political voice.287 
The Supreme Court uses the standard to protect that group from discriminatory 
behavior, usually long-standing. Within the context of Bob Jones and the application 
of the fundamental public policy doctrine, this overlay seems particularly apt. 
Moreover, even after a group is added to the standard, the group can be reexamined 
as societal preferences change.288 
Fundamental policy public under this heuristic would not cover all potentially 
harmful behavior that goes against public policy. For example, discrimination based 
on gender or sexual orientation would not be covered under this standard.289 The 
rigidity of the standard also often lags far behind societal preferences. For example, 
in Obergefell, the Supreme Court did not decide the standard of scrutiny it applied 
to the marriage statutes in the context of same-sex marriage.290 The Supreme Court 
did use signals of strict scrutiny by calling the right a fundamental right. However, 
the Court did not clarify whether it was referring to the right to marry, the rights of 
LGBT individuals, or something else altogether. There has been much criticism of 
the Supreme Court for failing to articulate a standard.291  
Assume that post-Obergefell, the IRS believes that it is required to act against 
institutions that violate fundamental public policy as determined by groups to which 
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the strict-scrutiny standard would apply. The IRS denies the Boy Scouts their tax 
exemption because the proxy for fundamental public policy has now switched to a 
strict-scrutiny analysis arguably after Obergefell.292 From the Boy Scouts’ 
perspective, there is no clear signal that they have violated the fundamental public 
policy overlay. But equipoise is the signal by the Supreme Court that they are outside 
of societal norms and mores. Would the Boy Scouts be surprised by an IRS 
challenge? It would be hard to believe they would be.  
As one can see, the use of the strict scrutiny standard requires time and 
consideration by the Supreme Court. This then supports the conclusion in Bob Jones 
that the fundamental public policy standard requires a clear harmonization of societal 
preferences. Additionally, the standard provides a preference in favor of rescinding 
the discriminatory behavior over religious liberty. But there are limits on the 
standard. For example, the Supreme Court is not always clear in the applicable 
standard of review nor does the standard cover all types of discrimination. If a more 
inclusive standard is desired, we would propose using the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
B. Civil Rights Act of 1964 
The fundamental public policy rule is not amenable solely to traditional 
constitutional law frameworks, however.293 Scholars such as David Brennen, for 
example, have recommended using the more expansive Civil Rights Act of 1964 for 
the applicable testing standard.294 In order to attempt to stay within a constitutional 
law frame, they acknowledge that the Civil Rights Act would only apply to a private 
actor if it receives federal financial assistance.295   
This line of reasoning has failed to be persuasive because the Court has yet to find 
the providing of a tax exemption as the functional equivalent of federal financial 
assistance.296 Brennen and others are trying to overlay the Civil Rights Act on the 
rules of 501(c) in a similar fashion as the fundamental public policy doctrine.297 This 
approach faces many hurdles as it enters into the difficult debate as to whether or not 
a tax exemption is a subsidy. Neither scholars nor courts have come to a majority 
position.298 
For our purposes, however, the constitutional constraints are irrelevant. We do 
not suggest that tax-exempt organizations are in all circumstances bound by the Civil 
Rights Act; rather, we propose that for the purposes of creating a taxonomy for the 
boundary of the fundamental public policy doctrine, the use of the Civil Rights Act 
as a proxy fits well within the legal reasoning of Bob Jones. By using the Civil Rights 
Act, rather than Treasury discretion, to establish a framework for the fundamental 
public policy rule, we avoid various objections and problems. If we were proposing 
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adding the Civil Rights Act as another standard, then we would face the existing 
shortfalls in Brennen’s arguments. Instead, if the purpose of the fundamental public 
policy doctrine is to override the charitable exemption once an organization is outside 
the bounds of public mores or norms, then the Civil Rights Act is an important proxy.  
The Civil Rights Act has created a large body of cases and, as a result, would 
provide many data points to help sort out what constitutes a fundamental public 
policy.299 By utilizing the vast case law in the Civil Rights Act, charities will know 
when they are approaching the boundaries of the standard. Moreover, the standard 
shifts over time with societal preferences. As we pointed out earlier, if our goal is to 
allow charities to act without concern to an unknown standard and we want that 
standard to be flexible, the Civil Rights Act shows promise as a proxy.  
The Civil Rights Act may not represent a perfect match for what the Court meant 
by fundamental public policy, of course. It currently only protects individuals from 
discrimination based on race, color, national or ethnic origin, religion, sex, age, and 
disability.300 There are various discriminatory behaviors that are outside of the Civil 
Rights Act. For example, neither sexual orientation nor marital status is covered by 
the Act.301 Additionally, there are carve outs or fixed exemptions built into the Civil 
Rights Act. For example, a school can discriminate based on sex if it is part of the 
historic educational mission.302  
As it stands, the limitations of the Civil Rights Act as a proxy could be explained 
through the following example. Suppose that a religiously affiliated educational 
institution refuses to hire a woman as provost because of its religious doctrine. 
Although Title IX of the Civil Rights Act proscribes discrimination based on gender, 
it may permit an exemption in this case. The interpretive problem is framed as 
follows: is that exemption a statement of public policy, which would thus function 
as a carve-out of Bob Jones fundamental public policy, or is that exemption 
permissible because without strict scrutiny, free exercise controls?303 It would seem 
that under Bob Jones, the fact that Congress exempted out this behavior would cut 
in favor of the institution. Moreover, if Congress removed the exemption from Title 
IX, it would be a strong signal that this is not permitted under the fundamental public 
policy doctrine. 
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As one can see, these restrictions may cut both ways. On one hand, one might 
believe that the Civil Rights Act is not inclusive enough to capture what may be 
considered a Bob Jones violation of the fundamental public policy doctrine. For ex-
ample, Obergefell shows that although discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
not covered by the Civil Rights Act, according to the majority, it rises to a similar 
standard. The Civil Rights Act as a proxy, in that case, may not be inclusive enough. 
On the other hand, the finite application of the Civil Rights Act is exactly the type 
of standard that must be in place in order to have a clear guideline for charitable 
action. The fact that Congress has not acted to include groups in the Civil Rights Act 
and the exemption of some groups from the Act are clear indications of public 
opinion. The purpose as articulated in Bob Jones of the fundamental public policy 
exemption is not to be a test against contemporaneous societal norms or mores but 
against established ones. The Supreme Court used many factors in determining when 
an action crossed the threshold. Thus, the Civil Rights Act, with all of its perceived 
limitations, demonstrates its promise as a proxy.  
Moreover, a denial of exemption by the IRS for violating fundamental public 
policy will end up in courts. In the ultimate balancing test between free exercise and 
the discriminatory behavior, the Supreme Court will be faced with the determination 
of priority of protections. When we proposed using the strict scrutiny standard, the 
balance tilted in favor of denying the exemption because discrimination that rises to 
applicability of strict scrutiny takes priority. Here, we cannot rely on that de facto 
determination. Therefore, this will be a true balancing test. The violation of the Civil 
Rights Act allows the Supreme Court to use it as a foundation for determining the 
public opinion.  
C. Treasury Blacklist 
To this point, we have articulated two standards that could be used to define 
fundamental public policy. First, we analyzed a strict scrutiny standard, which would 
be based on judicial interpretation: the Supreme Court would add a class to the 
standard and have to maintain a class within the standard. Second, we looked to 
congressional action through the Civil Rights Act. In this section, we look to an 
executive-based standard as defined by the Treasury Department. Here we argue that 
the Treasury should use a sure shipwreck to allow and encourage compliant behavior. 
By maintaining a blacklist of impermissible discrimination, tax-exempt entities 
would have clear guidance on compliance.  
One reason we advocate for a potentially more expansive view is because of the 
limitations on the prior standards. Whether those limitations are positive or negative 
depends on the amount of additional regulation charities should be subject to. If the 
goal of fundamental public policy is to prohibit tax-exempt entities from receiving 
an exemption when they act outside of public norms or mores, then a more expansive 
interpretation of what constitutes fundamental public policy may be warranted. 
Under the Yoshino and Tribe interpretation of Obergefell, discrimination based 
on sexual orientation would violate the fundamental public policy doctrine. Churches 
and other religious entities would necessarily be protected from losing their 
exemptions anyway, as we have discussed above. However, Bob Jones itself makes 
clear that religiously affiliated institutions do not enjoy the same level of exemption 
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from the fundamental public policy doctrine.304 A religious school’s discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation would violate the equal dignity of the individual. 
Additionally, under this most expansive taxonomy, single-gender schools may also 
violate the standard.  
As it is evident, a standard Treasury blacklist is the most fluid of our proposed 
standards, requiring charities to continue to monitor the landscape while, at the same 
time, providing them with a clear guide to current public policy standards. This 
progressive standard ultimately could prove the most enlightened. For example, 
assume that a single-sex school discriminates against transgender individuals. In 
order to not deal with the accommodation of these individuals as related to bathroom 
facilities, locker room facilities, sports teams, and the like, the school will not admit 
such students. Under current rules, transgender students are not subject to strict 
scrutiny nor, currently, are they subject to the Civil Rights Act.305 Thus, under the 
two prior safe harbors, the IRS would be unable to deny or revoke the school’s 
exemption. 
However, the legal treatment of transgender individuals is rapidly changing. In 
ten years, discrimination against transgender individuals will likely seem as offen-
sive as racial discrimination is today. Currently, transgender individuals are suing 
educational institutions for violations under Title IX.306 Although the cases have been 
dismissed to date, there is no guarantee the courts in the future will not change their 
interpretation of Title IX.307 
In fact, the treatment of transgender individuals illustrates why a Treasury 
blacklist may be the best way to approach the fundamental public policy rule. While 
transgender individuals have not yet had success at the judicial or legislative 
branches, on May 13, 2016, the Obama administration sent a “Dear Colleague” letter 
to public schools, announcing that it believed that Title IX protected gender 
identity.308 Because of the flexibility the executive branch enjoys, it could move far 
more quickly than Congress or the courts.  
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The use of the equal dignity proxy allows the IRS to prohibit certain behaviors. 
Because of the fluid nature of the standard, it would require more notice by the IRS. 
For example, the IRS can continue to maintain a list of what it considers “protected 
classes” in order create compliance by charities. This would allow charities to either 
have a safe-harbor or challenge the denial of exemption. Rather than be behind the 
curve and wait until it is painfully obvious that the behavior was inappropriate, the 
IRS can achieve the same result quicker. 
For example, if the goal is to not permit charities to enjoy tax-exempt status when 
they violate fundamental public policy, then time should not be the proxy as it was 
in Bob Jones. There are at least two possible ways that the IRS could determine when 
to include a group. The IRS, in the most expansive approach, would produce yearly 
lists of prohibited behavior. The concession for compliance with the public opinion 
portion of the standard, the IRS would have to self-select. If a more rigorous process 
was necessitated, the IRS could go through a yearly notice and comment process. 
Through the administrative state a thoughtful inclusion of groups would occur. 
Because we would be relying on interest group politics to prevent a group from 
entering the list before there was alignment, we would not be adding groups or 
removing groups before we had a proxy of public opinion.309  
A collateral consequence of this approach would be that the IRS is no longer using 
prosecutorial discretion to opt out of decision making. One of the main criticisms of 
the current ad hoc approach is that there is no clear understanding outside of race 
when or if the IRS will use the fundamental public policy stick. Theoretically, the 
IRS could use this stick at any time for any behavior. Under our sure shipwreck 
approach, the IRS would be explicit in its decision making.  
Giving Treasury the authority to determine what constitutes a fundamental public 
policy is not, of course, a perfect solution to the problem. In the first instance, it 
deposits significant authority in the Treasury Department, which alone would get to 
decide what types of discrimination violate public policy.  
We are not put off by this, however, because the Treasury Department already 
determines fundamental public policy. The IRS determines whether to grant and 
whether to revoke tax-exempt status. While would-be tax-exempt organizations can 
challenge its decision when it decides that they do not qualify because they violate a 
fundamental public policy, the public cannot directly challenge the IRS’s 
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determinations. Our proposal leaves that authority with the IRS, but adds a level of 
transparency—the IRS has to say, in advance, what type of discrimination it views 
as violating public policy. With that list available to the public, the IRS must justify 
and explain its decisions. 
In the second instance, some may question whether the standard has gone too far 
or not far enough. Some might advocate that this approach does not goes far enough. 
We should not be tacitly supporting actions that are against public policy. By 
definition the disenfranchised group does not have political voice, and that is the 
reason for the equal protection standard. Thus, by a more proactive standard, we are 
encouraging social change. In our prior example, the school would be denied tax-
exemption because of its effects on the transgender individuals.  
Problematic with that approach is that it requires us to predict where societal 
norms and mores will be in the future. As we can see in the context of strict scrutiny, 
there are not even constants in this highest constitutional standard. By pushing the 
standard forward based on a contemporaneous understanding of the problem without 
the benefit of time, a deleterious standard might apply. 
CONCLUSION 
We find it interesting that Obergefell, a case that has no direct link to taxes,310 has 
provoked such a public and emotional debate over tax status. And yet it has. Tax-
exempt status appears to be important in the public mind, and the potential for losing 
that tax-exempt status has proven to have real political salience. While the American 
public at largely likely does not understand the intricacies of the Bob Jones decision 
or the contours of the fundamental public policy rule, they realize that Obergefell 
changed something. As a result, unfounded or not, the potential of the Court’s 
decision in Obergefell to cause religious organizations that oppose homosexuality to 
lose their tax-exempt status has mobilized a significant swath of Americans. 
And fears that churches will lose their tax exemptions in the wake of Obergefell 
are entirely unfounded. Notwithstanding the fundamental public policy rule, 
churches that discriminate against LGBT individuals will not lose their tax exemp-
tions. Whether the Constitution provides for church autonomy or churches merely 
have the same associational rights as others, Bob Jones is inapplicable to churches 
that oppose same-sex marriage. Obergefell’s holding that marriage is a fundamental 
right does nothing to change that conclusion. 
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For religiously affiliated institutions, however, the calculus is different. Although 
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Obergefell does not mention the fundamental public 
policy requirement, its holding may represent a shift in fundamental public policy. If 
its holding—or its embrace of equal dignity—means that discrimination based on 
sexual orientation violates a fundamental public policy, religious schools and other 
religiously affiliated organizations face a loss of exemption if they discriminate. 
Even where that discrimination is based on religious beliefs, the Supreme Court has 
held that the interest of the government in encouraging fundamental public policies 
allows revocation or denial of exemption. 
Moreover, even if Obergefell does not mark a shift in fundamental public policy, 
that shift will happen at some point. The problem is, under the current diachronic 
fundamental public policy regime, tax-exempt organizations have no way to know, 
ex ante, what will violate a fundamental public policy. Only after violation has 
occurred, and exemption has been revoked, do the contours of fundamental public 
policy become clear.  
Although punishing bad actors may be emotionally satisfying, we believe that the 
purpose of the fundamental public policy is to discourage such behavior in advance. 
As a result, we have recommended three safe harbor regimes that will allow 
religiously affiliated tax-exempt organizations to know what kinds of discrimination 
are incompatible with tax exemption before they must act. Tying the definition of 
fundamental public policy to strict scrutiny, to the Civil Rights Act, or to equal 
protection would work. In the end, though, we believe that the flexibility attendant 
to equal protection, mixed with the nimbleness that the Treasury Department would 
enjoy in crafting a blacklist of prohibited discrimination, would provide the best and 
most effective safe harbor regime. 
It would also require little additional work. Presumably, the Treasury Department 
already has a sense of what it believes violates fundamental public policy and weighs 
exemption applications against that sense. To create the blacklist, it would merely 
have to formally list those criteria, an exercise that would eliminate arbitrariness in 
the application of the list and would provide certainty to tax-exempt organizations. 
And where it believed fundamental public policy was shifting, or where it believed 
that tax-exempt organizations were skirting the rules, it would have the ability to 
amend the list.  
With the clarification provided by a sure shipwreck rule, religiously affiliated tax-
exempt organizations would be able to weigh the relative value of their religious 
commitments and the cost of following those commitments. The safe harbor would 
necessarily not prohibit discrimination, but it would require organizations that 
wanted to discriminate to internalize additional costs in making that decision, which 
would, in the end, discourage actions that violate public policy while respecting the 
religious liberty to act badly. 
 
 
